Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea

Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea

 

 

 

Dr. Sung-Soo Kim has a Ph.D. in history and works as executive director of Transparency International-Korea. He was head of the International Cooperation Team of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea. He is also a journalist for OhmyNews and the author of Biography of a Korean Quaker, Ham Sok-Hon.

 

 

“Human history is like the roots of a tree. We cannot expect a tree to flourish if we cut its roots. Likewise, we cannot dream of building a bright future while we ignore our history.”

 

-- Sung-Soo Kim

 

 

 

CONTENTS

 

I.                    Backgrounds

II.                 Mandate, Structure, Function, and Responsibilities

III.             Main Achievements

IV.           Limitations

V.                Further Agenda

 

 

 

I.                  Background

 

 

1.      Forced silence

 

The Korean people in the 20th century experienced brutal Japanese colonialism, the division of their country into North and South by the superpowers of the United States and Soviet Union, the Korean War, and various authoritarian regimes. Throughout the troubled century, many civilians underwent severe oppression and human rights abuses inflicted by the public power. Moreover, the families of these victims have continued to suffer in many ways. For example, before and during the 1950-53 Korean War, in South Korea alone, around 200,000 innocent civilians were massacred by their own police, military, soldiers both communist and anti-communist, and even U.S. soldiers.

Yet even after the end of the Korean War until the beginning of the 1990s, the bereaved families of the victims were considered guilty by association and the family involvement system, and continued to be victimized and suppressed by the public power. They were blacklisted and not allowed to get decent jobs, work in the public sector, or even go abroad. The national police and secret agents tailed them wherever they went, and their children were bullied at schools as “offspring of commies.”

A succession of authoritarian regimes harshly suppressed anyone who hinted or suggested that South Korean forces might have executed innocent civilians and abused human rights. In addition, bereaved families who exhumed their relatives for proper burials were harassed or arrested for being communists or communist sympathizers. However, it was common knowledge among scholars, civil rights activists, and even the common people that the massacres were conducted by their own government. Yet due to the oppressive national security law, which threatened life in prison as a penalty, hardly anyone in the South Korea, apart from a few, dared to speak up in public about such crimes of the public power.

During the periods of authoritarian rule (1948-60), military dictatorship (1961-87) and transitional semi-military period (1987-1992), there were also frequent human rights abuses in the name of national security. Civil rights activists, dissidents, protestors and sometimes even innocent civilians were dragged away by police and secret agents and then tortured until they became permanently disabled. They were even summarily executed without proper trials. At that time, not only the North, but also the so-called “free democratic” South Korea was run by cold-blooded despotic leaders or military dictators. To summarize, Korean history after World War II is marred by a series of bloody military coups, massacres and sham trials of suspected communists and dissidents.

Correspondingly, under those authoritarian regimes, any sympathetic comment regarding the massacres was subject to severe prosecution. At the same time, the bereaved families suffered harsh discrimination, as authorities systematically marginalized them from all sectors of society and placed them under constant surveillance by police and secret agents. Therefore, compulsory silence and amnesia under successive authoritarian regimes forced survivors and bereaved families to keep complete silence. By doing so, the military dictatorship prevented the victims and their families from revealing stories buried for a lifetime.

Some demonstrators simply disappeared, and those who survived from unbearable tortures were forcibly enlisted into the army, where some of them suspiciously lost their lives in bunkers and barracks. Nevertheless, persistent efforts to establish truth regarding beloved family members were persecuted by the authoritarian regimes, and therefore the victims’ families suffered even more. In particular, after the 1960 Civilian Uprising, bereaved families requested answers from the government to find the truth regarding the deaths of their family members. However, in 1961, the military junta of Park Chung-hee responded by punishing them as “commies who help North Korea” or “dangerous rebels.” Therefore, these families, living in extreme fear, remained in forced silence for nearly 60 years.

Only after the end of military regime and the emergence of a civilian government in 1992 were the bereaved families of victims of massacres and human rights abuses able to give voice to long-repressed grievances. Thus, only after Korea was democratized did it begin to openly address the past wrongdoings of the public power. However, unfortunately, most of the eyewitnesses and survivors are now already dead. A few surviving victims or bereaved families are quite old, and their memories of the past ruthless massacres and human rights abuses are still fresh and permanently etched as indelible traumas in their minds.

 

 

2.      The end of silence

 

Prior to early 1990s, South Korea was ruled by anti-communist, authoritarian regimes that wanted to keep hiding the history of massacres and human rights abuses against people who had been accused of being communists. Therefore, only as a result of the democratization movement and the considerable sacrifice of numerous individuals were Koreans able to expel the military dictators and establish a civilian government. Notably, in 1997, Kim Dae-jung, the “Korean Nelson Mandela,” was elected as the president. He later went on to become the first Korean Nobel Peace Prize laureate.

Meanwhile, from the early 1990s, under the civilian government, many civil society groups began a nationwide campaign to establish a body to deal with the past massacres and human rights abuse issues. At the same time, victims’ families, human rights activists, civil society, and academics held tent demonstrations in front of the National Assembly for 422 days and nights.

Subsequently, in January 2000, longtime human rights advocate Kim Dae-jung enacted the Special Act to Find the Truth on Suspicious Deaths. Thus, the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths was inaugurated in October 2000. This Commission had a mandate to investigate the deaths of citizens who were engaged in democratic activities in South Korea between 1975 and 1987. In other words, the Commission’s mandate was limited to the suspicious deaths of people who had been involved in the democratization movement against the authoritarian regime, and whose deaths could be linked to their participation in the democratization movement after August 7, 1969.

At any rate, in December 2004, the Commission concluded that the dictatorial regime was responsible in 52 cases. In 30 of the 83 cases investigated, the Commission did not come to a clear conclusion, including the case of renowned political leader Chang Jun-ha (1918-1975). The Commission brought to light the authoritarian regimes’ actual practices of repressing the democratization movement, the abuse of public power, and routine infringements on basic human rights. This has given the government the grounds for making corrections to the past shameful history and the opportunity to resolve to develop South Korea into a more democratic state with high level of awareness of human rights.

 

 

3.      Uncompleted job

 

However, the Commission did not have the power to subpoena, so many officials and perpetrators did not cooperate with the Commission. Due to its insufficient rights, non-cooperation by other governmental agencies, and lack of time, the Commission was unable to reveal the truth to the fullest possible extent. The investigation was greatly hampered by the negligence of other governmental agencies in providing information and documents connected with the deaths, as well as the practice of preventing investigators from approaching targets to be investigated.

Therefore, the investigation of the suspicious deaths was accompanied by many difficulties. For example, the public power which was involved in the deaths may have attempted to hide the facts systematically. Also none of the scenes of the deaths was preserved and some documents and evidence were lost. Furthermore, some crucial witnesses had died or had lost their memories. In this respect, when the Commission completed its work in 2004, the bereaved families, civil rights activists, liberal scholars and law makers felt that a further, much broader Truth Commission needed to examine massacres and human rights abuses by decades-long authoritarian regimes.

 

 

4.      Civil power

 

Therefore, after the termination of the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths, bereaved families, civil rights activists and scholars began to demand the enactment of a special law to unveil the truth of the massacres and human rights abuses on a full scale, regardless of whether the victims engaged in activities for the democracy movement or not. What was more, the bereaved families, human rights activists, civil society groups, and academics again held tent demonstrations for 180 days in front of the National Assembly in order to appeal for the establishment of a full-scale investigative governmental body.  

Thus, the settlement process of the most tragic period started with civil power. After over half a century since the sudden close of the first Truth Commission in 1949, social campaigns and movements emerged to restore the honor of victims, survivors and bereaved families by facing what really happened and making corrections to the fabricated past that covered the truth of the massacres and human rights abuses.

Working alongside these human rights activists and bereaved families, liberal lawmakers proposed a bill to establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea (the Commission) to expose the hidden history of the abuse of public power from the time Korea was colonized by the Japanese until the authoritarian regimes of the early 1990s.

At the same time, a successor of Kim Dae-jung, former human rights lawyer President Roh Moo-hyun, also decided to create the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to launch a nationwide investigation to uncover the history of atrocities by the public power. After considerable debate, the bill became law in May 2005, and the Commission was launched on December 1, 2005. It closed its activities on December 31, 2010.

 

 

 

II.               Mandate, Structure, Function and Responsibilities

 

 

Under the “Framework Act on Clearing up Past Incidents for Truth and Reconciliation,” the Commission’s purpose as to foster national legitimacy and reconcile the past for the sake of national unity by honoring those who participated in anti-Japan movements and by exposing through investigation the truth of human rights abuses, violence, and massacres that occurred throughout the course of Japanese rule and the authoritarian regimes.

 

 

1.      Mandate

 

The Commission was tasked with investigating incidents regarding human rights abuses, violence, and massacres that occurred from the period of Japanese rule through the past authoritarian regimes. one of the most controversial elements of the Commission was the scope of its mandate. on one hand, liberal groups wanted to focus on massacres committed by the South Korean government and U.S. Army from 1945 to the end of the Korean War. on the other hand, conservative lawmakers regarded that as a one-sided approach, and as a condition for their support, insisted that the Commission also look into massacres by left-wing and North Korean forces during the Korean War.

Also, conservative lawmakers wanted to examine the contributions of overseas Koreans to Korea’s national prestige and the anti-Japan movement during Japanese colonial period. After hot debate in the National Assembly, the final legislation covered these five areas: the anti-Japan movement during the colonial period and the history of the Korean diaspora; massacres of civilians after 1945 and around the Korean War period (1950-1953); human rights abuses by the state under the past authoritarian regimes from the end of the Korean War into the early 1990s; incidents of dubious conviction and suspicious deaths; other incidents that are historically important that the Commission deems necessary.

The Commission’s goal was to prevent a distorted history that would lead to a distorted present and future. The Commission was an independent and temporary government body. The mandate covered approximately a century and started with the beginning of Japanese rule over Korea (1905) and ended with the fall of the authoritarian regimes (early 1990s) in South Korea. The Commission was tasked with screening petitions made by individuals, investigating and deciding on cases, and recommending measures to help establish truth and reconciliation.

 

 

2.      Structure

 

The Commission was run by 15 commissioners who were appointed by the three branches of the government: the president of South Korea, the National Assembly, and the Supreme Court. The commissioners used a U.S.-style jury system, and counted historians, religious leaders, lawyers, civil rights leaders, and social science scholars among them. Out of 15 commissioners, eight were appointed by the parliament, four by the president, and three by the chief justice of the Supreme Court. Each commissioner served a two-year term, with the possibility of reappointment for a second term. All of the commissioners received statutorily guaranteed independence in order to conduct their investigations without any instructions or interference. Dr. Lee Young-jo led the Commission after the previous chairmanships of Dr. Ahn Byung-ook and Father Song Ki-in. The Commission had 240 staff members and an annual budget of US$15-20 million.

 

 

3.      Function and Responsibilities

 

The Commission's truth-finding activities were not only meant to settle the grievances of the individual victims; they were also meant to function as preventive measures against a recurrence of similar incidents in the future. The Commission had been tasked with verifying the truth of the past and thereby fostering reconciliation between the victims and perpetrators. The Commission was also entitled to: offer recommendations to reinstate the honor of victims and mediate reconciliation between confessed perpetrators and victims; revise policies in order to prevent any similar atrocities from reoccurrence; and establish the Reconciliation Foundation when its work was completed.

The Commission’s additional responsibilities included indicating and documenting the recommendations of each fact-finding in a comprehensive report, thus providing preventive measures against future human rights abuses by the public power; providing reconciliation measures of the past; and providing an opportunity to advance democracy in South Korea. Settling past incidents can be defined as a process of clarifying facts about concealed incidents of the past, revealing the truth, seeking reconciliation, and taking preventive measures. While it was the Commission's task to reveal the truth, it was the mandate of the government to admit past wrong-doings, seek reconciliation, and fulfill measures. Recommendations are about the government's responsibility, which are considered follow-up or successive steps to truth verification.

 

 

4.      Reports

 

The Commission’s reports detailed not only the truth verification of individual petitions, but also gave overall guidelines to institute further policy making. At the same time, it aimed to be a role model for other countries seeking a similar course of history in terms of truth-seeking. The Commission published a comprehensive report in December 2010. The four-volume report was split into two electronic files, available on the Korean version of the Commission's Web site at (http://jinsil.go.kr/Information_Notice/report/index.asp). In March 2009, the Commission also released an English report, which is available on the Commission's English Web site. (http://jinsil.go.kr/English/index.asp)

For the Commission, completing petitions that had been filed was the minimum task that needed to be done to honor the memory of the victims and their bereaved families, who waited so long to tell their traumatic stories. There was also a moral and humanitarian obligation to present an accurate history, not only to the bereaved families, but also to the public, home and abroad, as a member of the global community. Since the South Korean government had never dealt with these kind of issues before, the Commission had been charged with addressing some of the most sensitive and painful events in 20^th century Korean history.

 

 

 

III.            Main Achievements

 

 

once the brutal facts of these massacres are out in the public, it's very hard for any government ... to get this information covered up again." 

 

-- Bruce Cummings

 

 

The Commission received 11,175 cases based on petitions from individuals to investigate the history of the anti-Japan movement during the colonial period and the Korean diaspora; the massacre of civilians after 1945; human rights abuses by the state; and incidents of dubious convictions and suspicious deaths. The Commission ended its investigations five years after its establishment, on July 31, 2010, and published its final report on December 31, 2010. In all, the Commission investigated 11,175 petitions submitted by the public. Of them, 8,450 (75.6%) claims were verified, 1,729 (15.5%) were dismissed, and 528 (4.7%) were unverified. It was not an easy task to find the truth of past incidents when the facts have been hidden and distorted for decades. With the support of many determined to discover the truth however, the Commission was able to achieve results.

In view of this, the Commission brought the truth to light and located socialist-affiliated independence activists who had been buried, and confirmed that civilians were illegally massacred by the public power in locations throughout the country around the Korean War period. In addition, the Commission brought fabricated charges by state authorities to light, such as the cases of presidential candidate Cho Bong-am by the Syngman Rhee regime; the case of President Cho Yong-su of the newspaper Minjok Ilbo and advertising suppression in the newspaper Dong-A Ilbo by the Park Chung-hee regime; and forced dismissals of journalists by the Chun Doo-hwan dictatorship. The Commission also showed that a series of espionage cases was distorted or made up entirely through illegal incarceration and cruel tortures.

In the summer of 1950, at the start of the Korean War, President Syngman Rhee ordered the massacres of around 100,000 or more civilians who were simply suspected of being communist sympathizers, without any evidence or trial. This war crime by any standard has been uncovered, acknowledged and publically addressed only by the Commission. The organized involvement of the military, police, and right- or left-wing groups enabled the public power to commit such crimes against humanity. Korea is only country in Asia to have revealed its disgraceful past to the public and international community. However painful it may be, knowing the truth can help Koreans build a better society and country in the future.

 

 

1.     Massacres

 

By and large, the attention and interest of the public and media, especially foreign media, has been focused on the petitions involving massacres. There were some particular types of massacre petitions investigated: the Bodo (or “National Guidance”) League Incidents; retaliation against alleged collaborators; civilian deaths resulting from U.S. bombings; and summary executions during the Yeo-Sun Uprising. Particularly important cases investigated by the Commission included the Ulsan Bodo League massacre, which was verified in November 2007; the bombing of Wolmi-do by U.S. forces, verified in February 2008; and the bombing of Gokgyegul Cave by U.S. forces, verified in May 2008.

The Bodo League Massacre occurred in the summer of 1950 during the Korean War. Estimates of the death toll vary; while police records estimate around 10,000 deaths, the Commission announced there may be more. According to Kim Dong-choon, a former Commissioner, at least 100,000 people were executed. The Commission found that during the Korean War, several massacres were committed not only by the North Korean military, but also by South Korean and U.S. Armed Forces.

The Commission attributed 82% of all petitions regarding wartime massacres to state agents (the police, the armed forces, or groups associated with the state), and only 18% to communists or left-wing groups. The Commission estimated that the data on 8,000 civilians killed during the Korean War represented only 5% of the actual number. Some main achievements of the Commission’s findings on massacres can be seen below.

 

 

1)      Massacres of prison inmates

 

In March 2009, the Commission confirmed that at least 3,400 civilians and inmates incarcerated in prisons in Busan, Masan and Jinju were massacred by South Korean soldiers and police from July to September of 1950. This marked the first time that a government agency formally confirmed suspicions that the military and police retreating immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War engaged in the indiscriminate killing of prison inmates. It may have been wartime, but it was a criminal act to illegally execute prison inmates and civilian members of the Bodo League in the Busan and Gyeongnam regions (which were noncombatant regions under the control of South Korea) simply out of concerns that they might cooperate with the North Korean Army advancing southward.

Most of the inmates were not death penalty cases, but prisoners with short sentences of less than three years for acts like violating the army’s criminal code. Executing convicted prisoners with established sentences in such a way was a violation of the rule prohibiting double jeopardy, as specified in the constitution. Among the inmates, some convicted prisoners were sentenced to death at a court-martial, transferred to the military police, and shot. However, the court-martial was just a formality; in reality, it was a massacre.

At that time, U.S. Ambassador Muccio expressed his disapproval to South Korean officials about these massacres, which included women and children. However, the overall commander, General MacArthur, said that this was an internal matter of the South Korean government, even though he then had official control over the South Korean forces. Since the South Korean military was created by the U.S., and the U.S. by and large controlled the South Korean Army, it is wrong to claim that the U.S. had no part in these massacres. The U.S. military was only was aware of the massacres, but assisted and even directed many of the executions.

 

 

2)      439 civilians massacred in Yeo-Sun uprising of 1948

 

In January 2009, the Commission confirmed that at least 439 civilians were massacred during the Yeo-Sun incident, which took place in Yeosu and Suncheon, two villages in Jeonam Province. The Yeo-Sun incident erupted in October 1948 when approximately 2,000 left-wing soldiers rebelled against the Syngman Rhee regime in protest of its brutal crackdown on an uprising on Jeju Island months earlier. The rebels staged guerrilla fights against the military and took cover on Jiri Mountain. When the Syngman Rhee regime intervened to quelch the uprising, a large number of civilians lost their lives.

Suncheon was the area with the highest number of civilian casualties. The number of people killed was confirmed at 439. However, the Commission estimated that if the people whose whereabouts could not been confirmed were included, the figure could increase to 2,000. The Commission verified that most civilians were killed by the South Korean military, which believed that civilians must have provided food, shelter, and other assistance to the rebel troops – or else they would have lost their lives because they happened to be living in areas of combat. The Commission confirmed that the military recklessly arrested civilians and used violence and torture against them.

During the uprising, the Syngman Rhee regime instituted martial law. With regard to this, the Commission announced that there were no legal grounds for such an action. The field commander must have illegally arrested and killed civilians based on his own interpretation of the law, an illegal act going beyond the purview of martial law. The Commission verified that President Syngman Rhee and the Defense Ministry were ultimately responsible for the civilian massacres, even though the direct order must have come from the field commander.

 

 

3)      First compensation sentence for Ulsan Bodo League massacre victims

 

The Ulsan Bodo League massacre was perpetrated by the South Korean police against suspicious left-leaning civilians, most of them illiterate and uneducated peasants uninformed or wrongly informed when registering themselves as Bodo League members. In Ulsan, hundreds of people were massacred by South Korean police during the early months of the Korean War. In July and August 1950 only, 407 civilians were summarily executed without trial. After truth verification by the Commission in January 2008, President Roh Moo-hyun apologized to the bereaved families for the 870 victims confirmed at Ulsan. Then in February 2009, Korea's Central District Court ruled that the government was responsible for the Ulsan Bodo League massacres, and thus responsible for providing compensation for their losses. Regardless of the scale of the compensation package, the ruling was significant since it was the first of its kind.

Furthermore, in August 2012, the Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling in favor of the victims’ families of over 400 alleged communists massacred by the public power during the Korean War. The bereaved families filed a compensation suit in 2009 after the Commission stated that the country was responsible for the deaths of the victims who were all civilians. The court said that the country committed a war crime against innocent people, and ruled that the government should compensate for their deaths regardless of any circumstances. The court also recognized the family members’ claim that they could not take any action until the truth verification by the Commission.

 

 

2.     Human Rights Abuses

 

The Commission investigated human rights violations and falsified accusation cases that occurred due to the abuse of public power. The cases were divided into those that had irrevocable court judgments and those that did not, and then they were categorized by type and period. Most of the cases of human rights abuse investigated by the Commission took place during times of political unrest, in the 1950s and 1960s, after the May 16th Military Coup of 1961, the Yushin period in the 1970s, and during the 1980s. The abuses occurred in the form of illegal detentions and torture by the police, army and national secret agency.

Notably, in most of the cases that received confirmed rulings, the prosecutors and court acknowledged the falsified confessions attained by investigators through illegal detention and torture. The espionage falsification cases occurred in the 1960s and 1980s and involved people who crossed into the South from the North, abducted fishermen, people with relatives in North Korea, and Korean-Japanese people.

 

 

1)      Cho Bong-am, ex-presidential candidate, cleared of spy charge

 

In January 2011, the Supreme Court overturned a guilty verdict on the late Cho Bong-am (1898-1959), 52 years after the nation’s first progressive party leader was executed on charges of espionage by the President Syngman Rhee regime. Cho, who created the Progressive Party in 1956, challenged Syngman Rhee in a presidential election and was executed three years later on espionage charges.

The retrial came after the Commission concluded in September 2007 that the original trial was clouded in mystery and the case should be retried. Cho has been viewed as the victim of a “judicial murder.” The Commission stated the subversion charge against him was created by the Rhee regime to “eliminate Rhee’s strongest rival in the presidential election.” on January 13, 1958, Cho was arrested by police on charges of spying and violating the National Security Law.

Cho was charged with being sympathetic with North Korea’s reunification policy and receiving funds from the North. Cho was initially sentenced to a five-year jail term by a district court. However, both the appellate court and the Supreme Court sentenced him to death on February 27, 1959, rejecting the call for a retrial from his family, who claimed the espionage charges were concocted through the use of faulty evidence and manipulated testimonies.

 

 

2)      Campus control to suppress democracy movement

 

The Commission confirmed in October 2009 that a policy of full-scale campus control was undertaken by the Park Chung-hee regime in order to suppress the democracy movement among college students. The Commission stated that after a movement centering in colleges that opposed Park Chung-hee’s Yushin Constitution gained force in the 1970s, Park Chung-hee labeled college students as “dangerous groups threatening national security” and implemented a policy of control at the pan-governmental level. This resulted in serious infringements of the human rights and freedoms of students and academics. Surveillance of campuses by secret agents was routine enough at the time that around 20 plainclothes policemen were stationed in each university. According to witnesses, secret agents visited students’ homes to dissuade them from participating in the student movement by offering gifts.

Amid the secret investigation’s report on students who had been expelled and identified as “problem students” was a list of the activities of 136 people at 16 universities over a 26-day period in 1979. This report included minute details on the everyday activities of civilians. For example, the report stated that “former Seoul National University student Shim spent time at home reading and did not leave the house except to go to church,” “Korea University student Lee left for school every day at 8:30 a.m., returned home at 18:00 p.m. Enthusiastic about studies,” and “former Yonsei University Prof. Kim met with dissidents and participated in problematic assemblies.”

Moreover, students imprisoned for violating the emergency measures were excluded from the Military Service Act, which exempted individuals sentenced to imprisonment from conscription. The Commission’s report stated that “according to secret documents from conscription authorities, they were instructed that ‘a policy has been established of enlisting those imprisoned in connection with campus disturbances as soldiers in active service.’”

Another method of campus control by government agencies came in 1975, when the “Student National Defense Unit” system was implemented. This was a campus military organization made up of students and college faculty. Out of concerns over negative effects, including government suppression and financial problems, college authorities also marched in step with government agencies in coercing critical students.

According to a list of “nine special instructions for establishing campus order” issued by Park Chung-hee in 1971, colleges were instructed to divide the entire student body among the professorial staff for instruction, not only according their academic endeavors, but according to their personal situations as well. Professors were required to provide reports, and those who did not cooperate were dismissed according to a faculty reappointment system introduced in 1975. Separate rooms were also created for student counseling and instruction, and agents were often present to monitor student activities.

The Commission reported that government agencies interfered in college administration matters by giving direct instructions on the number of students to be disciplined for being leaders in protests, as well as details for the discipline. The Commission concluded, “We must tell the truth about the campus suppressions perpetrated by the state and college authorities as a means of maintaining the dictatorship, and we must work so that it never happens again.”

 

 

3)      Violations of prisoners’ freedom of conscience

 

The Commission confirmed in November 2009 that it had completed its investigations on the truth about human rights infringements in connection with conversion tactics used on left-wing prisoners during Park Chung-hee’s Yushin era of the 1970s. The Commission announced that “conversion tactics applied under the ideological conversion system constituted state violence and fundamentally violated the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of conscience.” The Commission’s investigation also confirmed that acts of brutal torture and beatings were used to convert left-wing prisoners.

The Commission’s recommendations included a state apology to the victims, further investigation, and measures of restitution for the left-wing prisoners targeted for conversion tactics. The Commission stated, “Many individuals felt insulted as human beings or even committed suicide as a result of the conversion system, which was carried out systematically at the state level. Regardless of the individual’s ideology, the state should apologize at the minimum for using torture and beatings and infringing upon human rights.”

The “ideological conversion system” was put in place for prisoners designated as having leftist ideologies. They were forced to draft and announce “statements of conversion” indicating that they were renouncing their beliefs. This system was especially enforced at the time of the Yushin system out of concern that the release of unconverted left-wing prisoners might lead to anti-government instability in society. Beginning in 1973, “conversion maneuver squads and plans” were created. once an individual was targeted for conversion, that person was subjected to residence restrictions, protective custody, and observation even after the completion of a sentence.

For example, tactics were systematically used in a project to try to convert Mr. Ahn, age 79, who served over 40 years in prisons after being sentenced to a life term for violating the National Guards Act in 1953. Attempts were made consistently between September 1973 and November 1995. An entry made in 1974 includes references to “the falsehood of Communism and the superiority of democracy” and “a plan for conversion using family and acquaintances.” When Ahn refused to convert, more severe tactics were drafted in 1978, and notes were discovered saying that “family visit attempts are more successful than assailing theory, possibility of taking advantage of deteriorating health.”

The Park Chung-hee regime permitted Ahn to see his brother for the first time in two decades. During the first visit, the brother had asked, “Do you recognize me?” Although Ahn was unable to see his brother’s face clearly because of the lack of light, he still answered, “How could I not recognize my brother, no matter how long it has been?” Then the brother asked, “Do you want to live in prison when there is a beautiful world outside?” Ahn answered, “I hate this kind of society.” The director of the education division spoke up and said, “Put him back in.”

Ahn’s chance to meet his brother, even after the brother had previously been refused a meeting to inform Ahn of their father’s death, was made possible because the prison had summoned him to visit in order to convert Ahn. After the brother left, Ahn’s middle school-aged nephew sent a letter that said, “I do not know what conversion is, but please just convert and grant my father’s wish.” The suffering continued even after Ahn was moved to another prison. The prison later switched tactics and took an audio recorder to the house where Ahn and his brother had lived in some region and recorded the sounds of the door opening and closing, the clattering of a pot lid, and the voice of Ahn’s sisters.

Violence was also used in an attempt to convert Ahn and other left-wing prisoners. Ahn lost consciousness while being submitted to water torture, and ice water had been poured over his naked body in the middle of the winter in his isolation cell.

On the grounds that it violated the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of conscience, the ideological conversion system was replaced by the “pledge to obey the law” system in July 1998, only to be done away with in July 2003. The social security act was replaced by the security surveillance act in 1989, following criticism that the former had allowed the indefinite deprivation of basic constitutional rights.

 

 

4)      Human rights violations against students and fishermen

 

In January 2010, the Commission confirmed that human rights violations, including expulsions and dismissals, took place under the garrison decree invoked by the Park Chung-hee regime. Moreover, the Commission stated that human rights violations were perpetrated against fishermen who had been abducted by North Korea, and who were subsequently accused of espionage and punished following their return. The Commission also confirmed that college students were expelled or subjected to brutality following their arrests during the suppression of student protests in the 1960s and 1970s under the garrison decree.

The garrison decree, which was enacted in 1950 by a presidential decree, enabled military personnel to be stationed in certain regions in place of police officers to maintain public order. The act was invoked on three occasions (1965, 1971 and 1979) when the Park Chung-hee regime used it as a means of maintaining authoritarian order. It was first invoked throughout the entire city of Seoul in August 1965, after high school and college students held protests over several days in opposition to the signing of a treaty between South Korea and Japan. According to the Commission’s investigation, three professors were fired at that time, while another 15 professors were forced to retire. Forty-nine students were also expelled.

Immediately following the seventh presidential election on April 27, 1971, college students held protests calling the election a fraud. In October of that year, the Park regime invoked the garrison decree while announcing its “special order for the establishment of order in colleges,” and military forces were deployed to seven universities. The Commission announced, “When the garrison decree was invoked in 1971, more than 160 students were expelled, including student leaders.”

The Commission recommended that the state issue an apology for human rights infringements such as the expulsions and dismissals and clearly revise the legal basis and scope of the application of the garrison decree, which still exists. In addition, the Commission also announced that national institutions committed serious human rights violations by brutally punishing fishermen on suspicion of espionage or violation of the anti-communist law after they returned to South Korea following their abductions to North Korea.

These cases included fabricated espionage charges against fisherman Lee, who returned to South Korea, and charges leveled against fishermen for violating the anti-communist law. Through the early 1960s, investigation and intelligence organizations used abducted fishermen who had been returned to South Korea as a means of gaining intelligence about North Korea. Following a series of incidents involving armed communist guerrillas, they were arrested and punished on charges such as violation of the anti-communist law. They were also subjected to surveillance by investigative bodies even following their punishment; a “returned abducted fisherman supervision file” was created.

The Commission’s investigation revealed that in 1949, the police agency arrested nine returning abducted fishermen without warrants, including Mr. Choi and his wife, on charges of espionage and illegally detained them for a long period of time. During that time, they were brutally punished for their alleged espionage. The Commission stated, “These abducted fishermen, socially disadvantaged individuals who had difficulty even reading the protocol of examination for the charges leveled against them, were used by the Park Chung-hee regime for political ends.” The Commission’s recommendations included a state apology, appropriate reconciliation measures, and reexamination of the cases.

 

 

5)      Compensation for fisherman in forged spy case

 

In September 2012, a Seoul court ordered the state to compensate a fisherman who was falsely accused of spying for North Korea and spent 15 years behind bars in the 1980s and 1990s. The fisherman, Cheong, was abducted in 1965 by a North Korean ship along with 109 other fishermen while fishing in the Yellow Sea, and released one month later. However, 17 years later, in 1982, Cheong was taken into custody by the secret agency without an arrest warrant and tortured for 13 days. In 1983, he was again apprehended by the secret agency and confessed to espionage charges during an investigation after undergoing torture for 38 days. His wife and brother were also tortured and gave false testimony.

Cheong was indicted for spying for North Korea in violation of the National Security Law, which prohibits unauthorized contact with or activities sympathetic to the North, and was sentenced to lifetime imprisonment in 1984. He served 15 years in prison before being released on parole in 1998, but remained under government surveillance. In 2009, the Commission ruled that Cheong's case had been fabricated.

The 71-year-old Cheong and his family filed a suit against the government seeking compensation after being acquitted of the trumped-up spy charges in January 2011. The Seoul Central District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the government to pay 2.5 billion won (US$2.2 million) in compensation for inflicting mental and physical losses. “After arresting him without a warrant, the authorities tortured him to obtain a false confession and coerced witnesses to make false testimonies," Judge Rhee said in his ruling. “The court also handed down a guilty verdict without verifiable evidence. Even after being released on parole, the victim was monitored by law enforcement agencies. This is illegal conduct in which the state infringed upon the victim's basic rights." Hundreds of South Koreans have been abducted by North Korea since the Korean War ended in 1953.

 

 

6)      Falsification of espionage charge against journalist Jo Yong-su

 

Jo Yong-Su, founder of the progressive newspaper The Minjok Ilbo, was sentenced to death after being accused of treason after the May 18 Coup led by Park Chung-hee. Jo and seven others were executed in December 1961. The Commission verified that they were illegally detained at the government agency, which violated the rules of evidence, and therefore they should have been granted a retrial. The Commission recommended that the government officially apologize to the victims and hold a retrial based on the findings. In January 2008, a court ruled that the late Jo Yong-su was not guilty of the crimes for which he was executed by the Park Chung-hee regime. The court’s decision confirmed that the actions of the military regime were indeed a “judicial murder.”

 

 

3.     Exhumation

 

The exhumation of massacre victims from the Korean War period was undertaken for the first time on a national level by the Commission. In July 2007, the Commission began digging at four of the 160 sites believed to have been used for mass burials. These places were off-limits under past authoritarian rulers. Nationwide surveys on the status of victims were also conducted. The Commission initiated exhumation work for the first time since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The exhumations were of great significance in Korean history. In particular, the exhumations provided evidence of massacres that contributed to explaining what occurred to the victims, and offered consolation to their bereaved families.

At the excavated sites, the Commission unearthed the remains of 400 people. Skeletons were found stacked upon one another, with bullet holes in the skulls and hands still tied by rusting steel wire. The remains confirmed witness accounts that the South Korean authority often made victims crouch at the edge of a trench with their hands tied behind their backs before shooting them in the head and pushing them in.

The Commission assumed that innocent noncombatant civilians became victims because of massacres by the public power. For example, at that time, the South Korean military claimed that more than 1,000 "communist guerrillas" were killed at Bulgap Mountain. However, the exhumation revealed a different story. The Commission found 133 intact skeletons bending their knees and clutching their fingers behind their skulls. Among the victims, 21 were under 16 years old, and civilian articles like toys and hairpins were found, which indicated that the victims were civilians who were not involved in the military battle.

 

 

4.     Local collaboration and national reconciliation efforts

 

The Commission was authorized to allocate certain tasks to local governments or work in cooperation to achieve certain objectives. Receiving petitions, promoting application procedures, and implementing field research was conducted in cooperation with local governments. Together with 246 local government agencies, The Commission promoted its mission and petitions for investigation.

The Commission investigated many cases that had been distorted or concealed in the past. In addition to truth verification, the Commission helped restore the honor of many victims and bereaved families, and the government was urged to strive toward reconciliation according to the recommendations of the Commission through offering official state apologies, memorial service support, reexamination, registration of historical records, and providing peace and human rights education programs. The truth verification activities were an initial step toward reaching reconciliation. Without it, the achievement of reconciliation would be practically impossible.

In this respect, the Commission recommended a policy of memorial by organizing events, establishing historical records and monuments, and furthering peace education. It recommended that follow-up laws on reparations to victims be enacted, victims and bereaved families receive medical services, and those falsely convicted be given an opportunity for retrial. In 2008, following the Commission’s recommendation, President Ro Moo-hyun officially apologized to victims and bereaved families on behalf of the state for the massacres of the Korean War. That was a starting point for national reconciliation.

 

 

 

IV.           Limitations

 

 

“Korea lacks a confession culture, which could possibly lead to a better reconciliation between enemies of the past”

 

-- Song Ki-in, the first-term president of the Commission

 

 

1.     Unhappy ending of the Commission

 

The Commission had many severe limitations, including a lack of living witnesses, the fog of memory, a tradition of silence surrounding past incidents, and an inability to compel testimony by perpetrators. As former head of the international cooperation team of the Commission, I find it difficult to say that the Commission succeeded in achieving reconciliation by bringing the truth to light, as originally hoped.

The verification of most petitions filed at the Commission was difficult and protracted. This was partially due to the time that had passed since the incidents occurred. Despite the Commission’s careful approach to evidence, there remained constant doubts as to whether the truth could be verified without the strong authority needed to investigate alleged perpetrators. Since most concerned figures and witnesses had already died, it was nearly impossible to reconstruct many incidents from many decades ago.

When the Commission ended its activities in December 2010, 10 civil society groups, including the national association of families of Korean War massacre victims, decried the final report, saying that its inadequate content granted an indulgence to massacre perpetrators. Also in academia, some critics have contended that the report diluted the deliberate brutality of state authorities by presenting executions by the military, police, and members of the left wing side-by-side, and that by focusing on U.S. accounts of massacres by U.S. forces, it played up the perceived inevitability of those deaths.

The deeply embedded perception that the development of military dictatorships was responsible for South Korea’s economic development only added to the challenges of the Commission’s investigations. There were many limitations and constraints in investigating human rights abuses by the military regimes and in satisfactorily verifying the truth. Special interests in South Korea were closely linked with one other as beneficiaries of the past authoritarian rulers, and using these associations and networks, they worked to strongly suppress a democratic social transition. These forces hindered most of the Commissions’ activities from fulfilling the goal of reconciliation.

The Commission was formed more than half a century after the Korean War, which means most victims and perpetrators have already died, complicating the processes both of truth verification and bringing justice. Critics have questioned the value of delving so deeply into a violent era. The Commission also had very limited coercive powers and lacked the powers to search and seize materials from other governmental agencies.

 

 

2.     Conservative media and insufficient budget

 

South Korea's divisive politics kept the Commission from fulfilling its true potential. Conservative media attacked and even filed lawsuits against the Commissioners and investigators. Frantic anti-communism that paralleled the rise of McCarthyism in the U.S. has heavily influenced South Korea’s political atmosphere from 1953 onward, resulting in society’s collective amnesia over the massacres committed by South Korea and U.S. troops. The work of the Commission focused on the strong requests from bereaved families and civil groups. However, the Commission’s efforts to achieve its goals encountered resistance as a result of the present government’s strong influence on conservative media outlets.

The conservative or right-wing politicians and media outlets under the authoritarian regime were reluctant to cover or even mention the incidents. This attitude has continued even until now, as authorities and the conservative media have repeatedly ignored the Commission’s investigation results and the pleas of heartbroken victims and bereaved families. Instead, journalists copied foreign-based news sources whenever relevant material surfaced. Conservatives attacked the Commission ideologically and slandered the Commission’s work as a leftist or as a communist offensive against the right wing or national patriots.

Constrained by a budget and staff considered to be too small for a task as vast as dealing with atrocities committed over a half century, the Commission’s work could not proceed very quickly. Beyond that, it can neither force perpetrators to testify nor could it offer immunity for testimony, so only handful of perpetrators was willing to come forward. Some victims have stayed away as well, unwilling to open old wounds between neighbors caught up in the ideological struggle decades ago.

 

 

3.     Only God knows who committed the crimes!

 

In the case of the Commission’s reports, the names of individual perpetrators were all removed. This limitation was written into the original law that set up the Commission. The formation of the Commission represented a compromise between the liberal minority ruling party and the conservative majority opposition party at the time of establishment. The Commission was able to reveal processes and unearth incidents, but it could not create a case for the prosecution of individuals whose crimes were, for the most part, committed more than half a century earlier.

Despite the successes in uncovering massacres, some victims and the bereaved families stated that they felt cheated because the Commission was not granted the right to prosecute those who committed atrocities and inhuman crimes. In one case, when the Commission inadvertently revealed the name of a perpetrator, veterans sued the Commissioner and investigator. Having seen this situation, one victim stated, “Many of those human butchers and their offspring are now so wealthy, powerful, and strong!”

 

 

4.     Massacres and lack of follow-up for exhumation work

 

While hundreds of thousands of people are suspected to have been massacred by the public power, the Commission found it difficult to confirm the exact sequence of events and the death toll, since raising this issue was prohibited during the past authoritarian regimes. Most of the incidents occurred a long time ago, and it becomes more and more difficult to find specific witnesses and concrete evidence the longer fact-finding activities are delayed.

As of 2010, among the total of 10,860 petitioners, 3,166 petitioners (29.2%) were over 70 years old. This indicated that nearly one-third of the petitioners were elderly, with 24 petitioners (0.2%) over 90 years old; 530 petitioners (4.9%) over 80 years old; 2,612 petitioners (24.1%) over 70 years old; and 4,591 petitioners (42.3%) over 60 years old. There were concerns about the expediency of the petition process. Thirteen petitioners passed away while waiting for decisions on their appeals. Today this number would be much higher.

In the course of verifying the truth of the massacres, the basic objective to consider was the method of confirming the identities of the victims. This was a critical issue to address, as it would ultimately lead to the identification of the victims of the massacres and the determination of the legitimacy of the massacres. More than a half century had passed since such massacres took place, and except for the bereaved families of the victims, few witnesses, due to their age, were capable of providing an objective testimony about the harm inflicted upon the victims. Therefore, it was often quite difficult to secure any reliable statements from witnesses and confirm the actual course of incidents.

The most difficult issue in verifying the truth of the massacres during the Korean War was to determine the amount of responsibility for such incidents. This was a considerably serious issue as it related to the scope of the current government’s accountability. The Commission’s work was significant historically because of its goal of preventing any future occurrences in which the public authority might use its power arbitrarily against its citizens. Therefore, it was extremely difficult to acquire recognition regarding damage committed by the perpetrators. In addition, when determining who was legally and politically accountable, the initial difficulty the Commission faced was acquiring reliable information from other government agencies in Korea and from the U.S. records and witnesses.

In addition, when the Commission excavated massacre sites, the public and the media showed keen interest in the Commission's work. With so much interest, the exhumation work should be able to continue with a specific-long term plan in place. If this work were to be conducted in an ad-hoc manner, it would diminish the effectiveness of truth verification and reconciliation for the victims and bereaved families. By piecing together and acknowledging the massacres, South Korea would be able to finally put a dark chapter in history to rest, and the evidence could be used to help victims seek compensation from the government. However, due to lack of follow-up support for exhumations by the current government, the path to reconciliation has also disappeared with the wind.

 

 

5.     “Untouchable” U.S. bombing

 

It was obvious that during the Korean War, U.S. forces were in Korea to help South Korea, and did not inflict harm on civilians deliberately. Nevertheless, U.S. forces made mistakes during combat operations. In this respect, it is fair to expect that the U.S. government would admit to its mistakes and do something for the victims and the bereaved families before the grudges of human rights activists, at home and abroad, grow deeper and deeper.

As the Commission revealed in detail the mistakes of U.S. bombing during the Korean War, the current government, right-wing groups, and the conservative media felt very uncomfortable. To these groups, the U.S. should be portrayed in South Korea as a kind of “Father Christmas” that did not make any mistakes. Because of this, without closely examining official records and critical accounts from the witnesses, it was very difficult to determine whether civilian deaths caused by U.S. bombings were accidental, intentional, or organized at the last minute. Even if the mass civilian killings related to U.S. forces occurred in the course of legitimate military operations, it was not easy to regard them as mere usual wartime accidents. The fact that the U.S. bombings continued to produce civilian deaths suggests that the U.S. forces did not properly plan the operations.

Controversy arose regarding some of the Commission’s conclusions during its final months, especially over its recommendation that South Korea seek compensation from the U. S. government for only eight incidents of Korean War era atrocities committed by U.S. forces. The Commission had investigated 138 cases of atrocities, but according to the Commission’s then President Lee Young-jo, who was appointed by current South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, the other 130 cases were “more like cases of negligence than of liability or war crimes.” In the same manner, Lee Young-jo took the view that “the U.S bombing would not be legally problematic because intention or illegality was not an issue under the criteria of urgent military necessity.” Lee Young-jo’s view on the U.S. bombing incidents was very different from that of his predecessor, Ahn Byung-ook.

When he was the chief of the Commission, Ahn Byung-ook stated, “Even though the U.S. military needed to bomb, because bombardment without a proper civilian rescue act is clearly a breach of international humanitarian law, it is hard for the U.S. to evade responsibility.” In view of this, under Lee Young-jo, the Commission relaxed the U.S. bombing investigation criterion.

Under Ahn Byung-ook, 56 out of 157 (35.6%) cases regarding damage due to U.S. military bombing were verified. However, under Lee Yong-jo, the remaining 101 (64.4%) cases were dismissed or unverified. Moreover, at 35.6%, the rate of verification of U.S. bombing incidents was distinctly lower than the overall 85.2% for the rest of the received cases. At any rate, under Ahn Byung-ook, the Commission found that the U.S. violated humanitarian law by doing nothing to protect refugees affected by the blockade. Moreover, the U.S. should have conducted better reconnaissance to make sure it was bombing North Korean soldiers, not South Korean civilians.

In May 2008, the Commission verified that the U.S. Air Force bombed and strafed civilians seeking shelter in a cave, leading to over 200 deaths. The Commission recommended that the South Korean government negotiate with the U.S. government for restitution for the victims of the bombing, and that the U. S. and South Korean governments undertake a joint investigation of the incident to resolve further uncertainties.

In response to this, some bereaved families, such as the Wolmido residents, demanded joint investigation into U.S. bombing incidents. However, the South Korean government did not want to make any fuss with the U.S. government on this matter. Therefore, the Korean government did not take any recommendations from the Commission regarding the U.S. bombing incidents. In this sense, the U.S. was, and still is, “untouchable” to the Korean government.

 

 

6.     Human rights abuses

 

In establishing that there was torture and abuses of human rights, the Commission found it difficult to provide supporting evidence other than victim testimonies. There was no confession by the perpetrators. Cases of torture and human rights abuse were acknowledged if there was corroborative evidence such as the testimony of interrogators, coherent testimonies by multiple victims, a deposition by prison officers and families about side effects and their treatment, or extensive analysis of other circumstances.

Investigations of suspicious deaths were accompanied by many difficulties, which included the fact that the public power involved in the deaths may have tried to systematically to hide the facts. Thus none of the scenes of the death had been preserved, that some documents and evidence had systematically disappeared or were destroyed. Also, some crucial witnesses had already died, lost their memories, or were reluctant to come forward, as the victims’ families might be stigmatized by still powerful and strong perpetrators.

 

 

7.     Lack of government support and effort

 

Due to the limited amount of time, it was urgent that the Commission provide well-planned methodologies to restore the honor of the victims and the bereaved families, establish memorial facilities and manage memorial archives, and complete the overall plan to found a Reconciliation Foundation or archive to preserve the historical legacies introduced through the Commission’s findings.

Follow-up measures were supposed to be implemented by the recommendations follow-up board under the Home Ministry. Yet in reality, very little progress has made toward the establishment of a Reconciliation Foundation. A specific example of the importance of creating such a foundation would be the 54 cases of civilian deaths by U.S. Air Force bombings. Recommendations from the Commission included an official state-sponsored memorial event, as well as efforts seeking compensation for the victims through negotiations with the U.S. government. Some measures, like sponsoring memorial services. have been taken. Both the South Korean and U.S. governments, however, have failed to respond to the other recommendations of the Commission. Furthermore, the Commission’s budget was cut by the current government, which led to difficulties in completing its task.

 

 

8.     Different views of different Commission heads

 

“The current conservative government seems to be using every means to roll back all achievements of the previous liberal governments.”

 

-- Kim Dong-choon, former Commissioner

 

On December 2009, Lee Young-jo was appointed as the new head of the Commission by the South Korean president. Lee held totally different views from the former head of the Commission, Ahn Byung-ook, about the necessity of the Commission. While Ahn stressed the importance of bringing the Commission’s work to a timely conclusion, with important work remaining to be completed, the Lee sought to bring its activities to a premature close. For example, although more than 75% of cases concerning repression of Korean civilians by the South Korean dictatorship were completed at the time of inauguration of Lee, a significant number remained incomplete. In particular, cases involving the U.S. bombing of South Korean civilians and other atrocities remained to be investigated and resolved. However, Lee rather supported the legitimacy of U.S. indiscriminate bombing during the Korean War.

At that time, observers stated that the Commission dropped a greater number of petitions for investigation. Following Lee’s arrival as head, the criterion for truth verification also changed. The new criterion evaluated whether there was an “acute need in terms of military operations.” When speaking with reporters, Lee stated his position that “deliberateness and illegality need to be proven, and regardless of moral issues, legally there was no problem.”

A large part of the blame for this outcome falls on the president of South Korea, who has been opposed to addressing these historical issues. Lee, who was appointed by the South Korean president, led the way in diluting his own Commission’s powers, for example, by making statements that flew in the face of previous Commission decisions. Subsequently, the military and police, which in many instances were the perpetrators, took advantage of this atmosphere and postponed implementing the Commission’s recommendations, even going so far as to make moves to overturn the decisions. As a result, true reconciliation and reckoning with the past ended up being postponed until another day. The Commission ended on a note of disappointment. A foreign journalist described it as “Truth in danger in South Korea.”

 

 

9.     Banning of the Commission’s English report

 

Upon his inauguration as the Commission's new president Lee Young-jo in December 2009, Lee banned the distribution of the "poorly translated" report published under the former president of the Commission, Ahn Byung-ook, who was perceived as a liberal. Lee stopped the distribution of the Commission’s English report due to alleged translation errors, but the people who worked on the book disagreed, saying their honor has been violated by an apparent act of political censorship.

Lee claimed that the level of English was not up to par, but that was a pretext. According to an American scholar, Dr. Andrew Wolman, “In fact the English was near-perfect, but the introduction written by the Commission’s outgoing progressive president Ahn Byung-ook was seen as going beyond accepted limits in its criticism of Park Chung-hee and his motivations.”

Meanwhile, Australian journalist Hamish McDonald wrote in the Sydney Morning Herald, “A reading of the contested document (banned English report of the Commission) makes it clear that the English is not the problem: it is quite clear and correct. There is a distinct left-wing tinge to former Commission’s president Ahn's introduction.”

After a long legal battle initiated by the translators of the Commission’s English report, in May 2012, the Seoul Central District Court ruled that Lee Young-jo, the former head of the Commission, must pay 30 million won in compensation for abusing his authority and banning the distribution of the Commission’s English report. Many believed Lee, viewed to have an extreme far-right ideology, prohibited the distribution of the English report, which his liberal predecessor Ahn Byung-ook commissioned as a part of efforts in acknowledging past atrocities, for ideological reasons. The ban drew much attention as it exemplified the challenges the nation faces in looking at dark chapters of history and deceitful reconciliation efforts between the powerful perpetrators and powerless victims.

 

 

10.  Firing of investigator for disclosure of civilian massacres

 

An investigator of the Commission, Dr. Ahn Jeong-ae, disclosed the first documents confirming South Korean Army orders to massacre civilians in 1951 and the Syngman Rhee regime’s cover-up that took place afterward. In September 2010, the Commission fired Dr. Ahn for releasing closed documents pertaining to a massacre during the Korean War through a paper she wrote. The Commission informed Ahn that she had been fired for announcing a secret Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) file on the Geochang Incident.

In her paper, Ahn stated that at the time, the counter-insurgency force of South Korea’s 11th Division ordered that all residents in the unpacified areas of Sancheong, Hamyang and Geochang -- or as the order put it, “those in the hands of the enemy” -- be shot. She said this operational order remains intact in the CIC file “Material on the Geochang Incident, 1951.” Ahn also stated that the operational order was later changed to “summarily punish those committing enemy acts when they are found in the area of operations” after it later caused controversy in the National Assembly. The material Ahn released was significant, as it revealed for the first time through military documents that the South Korean Army, which was engaged at the time in eradicating pro-communist partisans, massacred civilians in accordance with orders.

 

 

 

V.  Further Agenda

 

 

“Truth and reconciliation are the only alternatives that can rationally connect the past, present, and future.”

 

– Ahn Byung-ook, second-term president of the Commission

 

 

Advocates said the Commission was closed because the current South Korean president and ruling party are uncomfortable with the scrutiny of the country’s past. Nevertheless, the establishment of a Reconciliation Foundation and enactment of a special law on reparation and compensation for victims are essential. Moreover, the government, on humanitarian grounds, should build a proper facility to preserve the exhumed remains of the massacre victims. Moreover, further investigations are needed on the U.S. bombing incidents, as well as the suspicious death of renowned dissident Chang Chun-ha, who was the rival of the dictator Park Chung-hee. In this respect, let me summarize some of these issues and make final remarks on the further agenda of the Commission for reconciliatory measures.

 

 

1.     Establishment of a Reconciliation Foundation is essential

 

In addition to truth-finding investigations, exhumation and fieldwork was conducted through a service contractor to find the necessary evidence and to build a Reconciliation Foundation. As pointed out by the Framework Act Clearing up Past Incidents, the government, therefore, ought to fund the establishment of a Research Foundation for past incidents. The Foundation would operate and manage a memorial and historic materials center, as well as support further investigation and cultural and academic activities related to settling past incidents. The independence of the Foundation should be guaranteed by law to perform such work.

Since there has been a high level of public interest in the Commission's exhumation work, the government should support it by amending relevant laws, simplifying administrative work, and preparing long-term facilities for the preservation of exhumed remains. By resolving these issues, national unity and reconciliation could be more properly promoted. The Reconciliation Foundation needs to plan for the enshrinement of the victims’ remains and prepare for future exhumation work by instituting regulations or laws and securing the necessary finances and procurement measures. However, the fact that victims’ remains have remained abandoned for so long and so close to where we live means that our society is still at an uncivilized and barbaric stage.

 

 

2.     Enactment of a special law on reparation for victims

 

As the Commission officially recommended, the government should enact a special law to compensate victims. For example, it should pay medical bills in cases where the Commission verified massacres and human rights abuses. Currently, each verified petitioner or victim makes a legal suit against the government by oneself with a great difficulty, which is a painstaking and lifelong process, and takes ages until the petitioner wins at the Supreme Court. Therefore, by enacting a special law on reparation and compensation for verified victims, our society and government can restore the honor of the victims and bereaved families who had long been labeled as communists or enemies of the state.

 

 

3.     Further investigation into U.S. bombing incidents needed

 

There is a need to further investigate the degree of possible U.S. involvement in civilian massacres. The Commission had more than 200 cases on its docket, based on hundreds of petitions recounting U.S. bombing and strafing runs on South Korean refugee areas during the Korean War. The Commission, at that time, urged the Korean government to seek U.S. compensation for the victims. Korean legislators then asked a U.S. Senate committee to join them in investigating declassified evidence showing that American ground commanders had adopted a policy of deliberately targeting refugees. However, due to the rapid close of the Commission, everything was left hanging in the air, unfinished. The Commission must complete its remaining tasks and achieve a concrete settlement of the past by revealing distorted and hidden stories, thereby leading to reconciliation.

 

 

4.     Full investigation into Chang Jun-ha’s suspicious death

 

Thirty-seven years have passed since the suspicious death of political dissident Chang Jun-ha. However, new evidence shows that he may have been murdered, instead of having died after falling from a mountain while hiking, as the Park Chung-hee regime claimed. In August 2012, the Society for the Commemoration of Chang Jun-ha and the Chang family submitted a petition to the Blue House asking for a full investigation into the death of Chang.

However, the petition and chances for a legitimate investigation now appear stuck. The petition was assigned to the Home Ministry, but there are no longer any investigators in the ministry in charge of handling petitions. Since the termination of the Commission, the ministry’s only relevant work has been the management of recommendations. The details of Chang’s death have long been hidden.

In 1975, the Park Chung-hee regime buried Chang’s corpse without an autopsy and before it could be independently examined. In 1988, the Roh Tae-woo government ordered a reinvestigation of the case, but all it could get was a one-page police report taken from the sole witness. The government’s inaction in investigating this new evidence creates the impression that they are trying to cover something up.

There is now new evidence that makes a strong case that Chang was murdered, and this evidence deserves to be publicly investigated. The government can accomplish this by thoroughly examining the physical evidence now available in order to determine the true cause of Chang’s death. once this is determined, the secret agency and military documents on the case must be made public. However, this is not the job of the Home Ministry because it has no jurisdiction over such an investigation. Thus, a special committee to investigate Chang’s suspicious death must be created with the approval of the legislature and support of the government.

 

 

5.     Unfinished jobs

 

Some bereaved families who were well aware of the Commission’s work were reluctant to file petitions when the Commission was launched because they clearly remembered the oppression and abuse they suffered under Park Chung-hee’s military junta in 1961, as well as their subsequent estrangement from society. These traumatic experiences prevented many from submitting petitions. People who had reached a high socioeconomic status also refrained from applying based on the fear that truth verification could undermine their status.

Only upon successfully completing its mission would the Commission be able to assist in building a more unified nation, constituting a role model for other countries that choose to pursue truth-finding activities. As a result, the Commission’s activities would show the international community that South Korea as a nation is committed to protecting human rights. The government and society as a whole should pay attention to the victims’ cases and try to relieve their suffering. Otherwise, Korea is neither a civilized nor democratized country.

If progressive politicians regain power in the upcoming 2012 presidential elections, it is quite likely that they will attempt to establish a new truth Commission to investigate the pre-1992 period.

Progressive civil society organizations, historians and political activists care deeply about the continuing imperative of truth-seeking, which they have promoted since November 2004 through the campaigns of a coalition of civil society organizations.

Assuming continued conservative control of the presidency, it is also likely that we will see an increased focus in the creation of truth commissions outside the government by various civil society organizations. The civil society groups are poised to emerge yet again as the leading force for dealing with the past if there is no action from the government. Human history is like a roots of a tree. We cannot expect a tree to flourish if we cut its roots. Equally, we cannot dream of building a bright future while we ignore our history. That is why “truth and reconciliation are the only alternatives that can rationally connect the past, present and future.”